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The reservation wage is an integral part of most theories of involuntary unemployment. We
use panel data to examine the empirical determinants of the reservation wage ￿ in particular
the in￿uence of previous wages ￿ and consider what this implies for the evolution of the natu-
ral rate of unemployment. We ￿nd that previous wages have a signi￿cant but relatively small
eﬀect on reservation wages (an elasticity between 0.15 and 0.47). We also ￿nd considerable
diﬀerences across genders with previous wages being more important for men and market wages
being more important for women. Overall our results suggest that unemployment will adjust
relatively quickly to shocks.
JEL Classi￿cation: J64, E24
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11 Introduction
In most models of the labour market, the reservation wage ￿ the wage that makes workers indiﬀerent
between taking a job or remaining unemployed ￿ is a central determinant of the actual wage, and
in turn, of the unemployment rate. The purpose of this paper is to increase our understanding of
the dynamic behaviour of aggregate unemployment by exploring empirically how individuals form
their reservation wages. In particular, we ask do the unemployed set reservation wages irrationally
close to previous wages even if previous wages are no longer a good guide to the current market
value of their labour? This question is important because reservation wage formation rooted in the
past will inhibit the timely adjustment of aggregate unemployment to shocks.
In the short run, following a negative shock (increase in payroll taxes, decrease in terms of trade
etc.), workers might seek to maintain living standards, reservation wages remain unchanged and
unemployment results. In the long run, however, workers￿ aspirations would tend to adjust to reality
and unemployment would return to its previous level. Precisely how long this adjustment takes,
depends on the extent to which reservation wages are determined by reality (current unemployment
levels, current market wage levels, unemployment bene￿ts etc.) or by workers aspirations that may
be in￿uenced by out of date variables (e.g. pre-shock wage levels). Unemployment will persist for
as long as it takes aspirations to adjust to the new reality. Furthermore, if we embed this process
in a structural search model such as Mortensen and Pissarides (1997), any exogenous decline in
workers￿ reservation wages would induce employers to post more vacancies, further reducing both
the level of unemployment and spell length.
We use the British Household Panel Survey over ten years (1991-2001) to provide direct evidence
of the link between reservation wages and previous wages at the micro level. We examine explicitly
to whether an individual￿s reservation wage is determined more by his own ￿lagged￿ wage (i.e.
the wage received in a previous job) or by the prevailing market wage. If the former is important,
then we will have micro level evidence of slow adjustment to shocks, supporting the macro-empirical
evidence of persistent unemployment. The main econometric challenge is to disentangle whether the
eﬀect of the previous wage re￿ects causality, or the fact that the previous wage contains information
about the unobservable characteristics of workers and is probably subject to measurement error.
We control for measurement errors and unobservables using an instrument (previous observations
of the same wage) and the panel dimension of our data.
Our empirical conclusions are clear, and appear robust to a number of alternative speci￿cations
and econometric treatments. We ￿nd a signi￿c a n t ,b u tr e l a t i v e l ys m a l le ﬀect of the previous wage
on the reservation wage. An increase in the previous wage of 10% increases the reservation wage
by between 1.5% and 4.7%. We ￿nd a large and signi￿cant eﬀect of the mean of the distribution of
wages on the reservation wage (an elasticity of around 0.3). The eﬀect of local unemployment rates
2on the reservation wage, is small (elasticity of around −0.1), and in some regressions, statistically
insigni￿cant. One other surprising result is that we ￿nd no signi￿cant eﬀect of unemployment
bene￿ts.
Our results suggest that the reservation wage (and therefore unemployment) will adjust to
any shock relatively quickly. The coeﬃcient on the previous wage is much less than unity but
signi￿cantly greater than zero. This suggests that the presence of persistence in wage formation and
unemployment but less than is suggested by aggregate data. Our results also highlight considerable
variation across genders with previous wages being more important for men and market wages being
more important for women. This is consistent with the view that women have more ￿exible labour
market behaviour than men.
This paper complements a number of papers in macro and labour economics. Ball and Moﬃtt
(2001) investigate similar questions using aggregate U.S. data. They construct an index of workers￿
wage aspirations and show that the decline is U.S. unemployment during late 1990s can be explained
by the fact that their aspirations variable was slow to adjust to rapid improvements in productivity.
Blanchard and Katz (1997,1999) suggest that diﬀerences in the estimated Phillips curves between
the E.U. and U.S. may possibly be explained by diﬀerences in the link between reservation wages
and previous wages.
Christensen (2001) shows that previous wages have an important eﬀect on reservation wage
formation in Germany. Fledstein and Poterba (1984) and Jones (1989) get similar results for the
U.S. and U.K. respectively. However these three studies interpret their results as re￿ecting the
impact of current wage oﬀers rather than backward looking behaviour of workers. We clearly
distinguish between the eﬀect of current oﬀers and the eﬀect of previous wages on reservation wage
formation as well as account for possible measurement error.
The paper is organised as follows. Section two discusses the data. Section three presents
the econometric results using OLS, IV and Fixed Eﬀects estimators. Section four presents some
re￿nements and tests the robustness of our basic results. Section ￿ve concludes.
2A F i r s t L o o k a t t h e D a t a
In order to conduct the analysis we need three basic variables: the reservation wage, the wage in
a previous job, and the person speci￿c market wage rate. We use the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS), a representative survey of randomly selected households over the 10y e a r sf r o m
1991-2001.1 Table 1 contains the de￿nitions and summary statistics (for the pooled cross sections)
of the variables used in the analysis. All the monetary variables are in 1991 pounds sterling per
week.
1For full details see Taylor et. al. (2002). The dataset excludes individuals living in the north of Scotland.
3The BHPS contains observations of the ￿rst two crucial variables (reservation wage and previous
wages) and allows construction of the third (expected market wage). In particular it contains an
after tax reservation wage variable, WR
it , that the result of direct observation. Individuals who
reported that they were not working were asked the following question:
￿What is the lowest weekly take home pay you would consider accepting for a job?￿
W et a k et h ea n s w e rt ot h i sq u e s t i o nt ob eam e a s u r eo fw a g ea s p i r a t i o n sa n dl e a v et os e c t i o n
4.1 consideration of its accuracy. The other crucial variable for our analysis is the wage in the
previous job2, WL
it. This is calculated as the net weekly wage received in the most recent spell
of employment. Note that it is not the case that the previous wage variable is simply the wage
reported at the last survey date (although it could be). An advantage of the BHPS is that it contains
detailed information on respondents labour market behaviour between waves. In principle, every
time period is accounted for.3
Table 2 show summary statistics for some key variables and ratios for both active searchers
and non-searchers.4 We are particularly interested in the relationship between the reservation
wage (WR
it ) and the wage in the previous job (WL
it) .W em i g h te x p e c tt h a tt h er a t i oo ft h e s et w o
variables (Reservation Wage Ratio - RWR) would be approximately one on average. But as can be
seen from the table, while the median is less than one, on average the reservation wage is higher
than the previous wage for both searchers and non-searchers.5 One would expect that unemployed
individuals would set a reservation wage less than their previous wage. The fact that so many
values of the reservation wage appear to be set so high suggests that there would be a degree of
persistence in unemployment. At the very least, the unemployed ￿ whether actively searching or
not ￿ do not appear to be particularly eager to price themselves into a job.
It is also clear from table 2 that the ratio is more skewed than either the reservation wage or the
previous wage. This can be seen more clearly in table 3 which shows the cumulative distribution
for the ratio for the sample as a whole and nine interesting sub groups. For all groups, about
sixty percent of individuals set their reservation wage less than the wage in their previous job.
However, the tails of the distribution are quite thick implying that there are a substantial number
of individuals who appear to set the reservation wages completely out of line with their previous
2We use the superscript ￿L￿ to denote lagged wage and use the terms ￿lagged wage￿ and ￿previous wage￿
interchangeably.
3See Halpin (1997) for a detailed discussion of this aspect of the BHPS.
4Table 1 shows that 54% of those providing a reservation wage satis￿ed the OECD￿s de￿nition of involuntary
unemployment i.e. actively searched for a job last month. The fact that individuals said that they would ￿like￿ a
job, and could suggest what sort of job it might be, was suﬃcient for them to be asked their reservation wage.
5Jones (1989) reports the mean and standard deviation of RWR to be 1.05 and 0.5 respectively. Feldstein and
Poterba (1984) report a mean of 1.07. Christensen (2001) reports a mean of 1.2a n dam e d i a no f1 .04.
4wages.6
An interesting aspect of table 3 is that there appears to be little diﬀerence between the various
g r o u p s ,a ta l lb u tt h el o w e s tR W R .J o n e s( 1989) found a similar result. Women do not appear to
have RWR much diﬀerent from men, although the left tail is more massive for women. This may
be evidence that women have slightly more ￿exible labour market behaviour than men. More of
them seem prepared to set a reservation wage substantially less than their previous wage.
Table 3 and table 2 suggest some diﬀerence between searchers and non-searchers. Searchers have
higher reservation wages than non-searchers (by about 45%), longer duration of unemployment and
also higher wages upon re-employment (WA
it - ￿Accepted Wage￿). Interestingly the ratio of the
reservation wage to the re-employment wage (WR/WA) is similar for both. Table 3 shows that the
distribution of the RWR is shifted to the left for the non-searchers i.e. more mass in the lower tail.
This suggests that as search intensity increases, fewer individuals are prepared to set a reservation
wage lower than the previous wage.
This raises the issue of whether to include self-reported non-searchers in the analysis at all. The
normal procedure in the literature dealing with reservation wages seems to be to restrict the sample
to searchers only (for example, see Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2001). However, fully 28% of those
who said they had not searched during the previous 4 weeks, were in paid employment by the next
wave of the data. The comparable ￿gure for the searchers is only 47%. This could indicate that
there are frequent changes in the level of search intensity by the same individuals throughout a
period of unemployment or, more likely, it may just re￿ect the ambiguity in the question. Clearly,
the two groups are diﬀerent ￿ but not that diﬀerent. So in what follows, we include both groups in
the estimation sample and in section 4.3 we look at the implications for our results of any diﬀerences
between them.
It is apparent from this preliminary analysis that the unemployed (whether searching or not)
are doing something wrong if they truly want to work. A degree of persistence in unemployment
seems likely because so many individuals fail set their reservation wages lower than the wage in
previous job, pricing themselves out of the market. However, we must admit the possibility of
an alternative explanation: that the reservation wages data is measured with a high degree of
error because individuals have no real idea how to set reservation wages or how to respond to the
reservation wage question ￿ making WR only a weak re￿ection of the unemployed￿s desire to work.
We discuss this ￿errors in variables￿ argument in section 4.1.
In any case, a crucial variable is missing from the analysis. We have made no attempt to take
into account the market wage an individual can expect to get if employed. The reservation wage is
only really of interest when set against this market wage. A high reservation wage may be perfectly
6Thick tails have been found in other studies. For example, Jones (1989) reported that 44% of his sample had a
RWR of more than 1.0. Feldstein and Poterba (1984) report that 24% of their sample had a RWR of less than 0.9.
5reasonable for a highly trained individual who can expect to secure a high paying job with relative
ease. Implicitly, we have used the previous wage as a proxy for the mean of the current wage oﬀer
distribution. Feldstein and Poterba (1984) and Jones (1989) adopted this procedure explicitly.
However, we want to examine the possibility that the wage in a previous job may have in￿uence
on reservation wage formation independently of the current wage oﬀer distribution. Once we have
controlled correctly for the current distribution of wage oﬀers, previous wages should be irrelevant.
If previous wages still matter, then that in itself represents a real rigidity in the labour market and
can generate persistent unemployment. In order to examine this possibility we need to control for
the previous and market wage rates separately. To do this we turn to a regression framework.
3 An Econometric Framework
In essence we want to run a regression with the reservation wage as the dependent variable and
various potential in￿uences on reservation wages as regressors. Of particular interest is the possi-
bility that the reservation wage could be a function of the wage received during a previous period
of employment and that this eﬀect is independent of the eﬀect of the distribution of current wage
oﬀers. We will estimate equation (1)w h e r e ,WR
it is the reservation wage of person i at time t, WL
it
is the individual￿s wage when last employed, ﬂ Wit is the mean of the distribution of wage oﬀers,
urt is the regional unemployment rate7,a n dXit is a vector of control variables (such as age, sex,
number of dependent children, asset income and the level of unemployment bene￿ts).
lnWR
it = β0 + β1 lnWL
it + β2 ln ﬂ Wit + β3 lnurt + β4Xit + εit (1)
It is important to note also that the previous wage is indexed by time t,n o tt − 1.T h i sc o n v e y s
the idea that reservation wage formation is backward looking from time t, t ot h ep e r i o dw h e nl a s t
employed ￿ which need not be the previous wave of the panel. Also note that the value of the
previous wage variable does not change with the passage of time unless the individual gets a new
job.
We include the mean of the current, person speci￿c, distribution of wage oﬀers, ﬂ Wit and a
measure of the probability of receiving an oﬀer, urt to counter-balance the lagged wage variable.
Whereas WL
it represents history, now possibly economically irrelevant, ﬂ Wit and urt represent current
economic reality. In principle, once ﬂ Wit and urt are included in the regression, WL
it should have no
eﬀect, unless reservation wage formation is in￿uenced by subjective processes such as pride. Thus
(1) is a regression of reservation wage on (our best measure of) objective reality and an individuals
subjective perception of that reality. We want to see which is the more important determinant of
reservation wages.
7Regional unemployment is from UK Labour Force Survey.
6We do not observe ﬂ Wit, so we construct ￿ Wit, a measure of the mean of the distribution of oﬀered
wages.8 We ￿rst estimate a standard wage equation on a sample consisting of all the newly employed
i.e. all those whose are in their current job for less than a year.9 The exogenous variables are human
capital variables (age, experience, education); household composition variables (marital status, the
number of dependent children of various ages, gender); local unemployment rates; and region-time
￿xed eﬀects and their interactions. Heckman￿s two step procedure was used to correct for sample
selection problem.10 We interpret these ￿tted values, ￿ Wit, as being the mean of the distribution
of wage oﬀers that an individual faces, conditional on his/her (observable) characteristics and the
characteristics of the local labour market.
3.1 OLS
We report the OLS estimates of equation (1) in Table 4. At this point, no attempt is made to
account for the panel nature of the data, all waves are pooled together. The regressions in column
1 uses a sample of both men and women and columns 2 and 3 perform the analysis on both gender
groups separately.11 We proxy the probability of receiving oﬀers by regional unemployment rates.
The bene￿ts variable is the level of state bene￿ts the respondent reported receiving at time of
interview. It is worth noting that, in the UK, the size of unemployment bene￿ts are not linked to
the wage received when last employed.12
For the moment we ignore the eﬀect of spell duration on reservation wages and con￿ne the
regressions in Table 4 to a sub-sample consisting of only one observation per spell. In the case of
8There is an expected wage variable in the dataset. But it seems to refer to E[W|W>W
R], and not E[W]a si t
is less than W
R in only 30% of cases. In any case, we want is an objective measure of the potential wage oﬀers that
the individual actually faces. In our framework the subjectivity is captured by the lagged wage variable.
9Restricting this ￿rst stage regression to new hires as opposed to all the employed seems reasonable as we are
trying to capture the market opportunities faced by the currently unemployed. Using a sample of all employed, did
not change the results much. The magnitude and signi￿cance of the coeﬃcient on W
L
it was unaﬀected while the
coeﬃcient on ￿ Wit was found to be higher in magnitude in some regressions - the diﬀerence being signi￿cant at the
5% level. Details of these results are available from the author.
10The dependent variable is log of usual weekly take home pay. The sample size at this ￿rst stage is 9,535. The
coeﬃcient on the inverse Mill￿s ratio is −0.59 with a standard error of 0.05. The ﬂ R
2 of the wage equation is 0.28 and
the standard error of the residual is 0.81. We follow Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001) and identify the mills ratio by
including total household non-labour income and investment income in the selection equation but not in the wage
equation.
11All regressions also include a cubic polynomial in age of respondent and the number of dependent children. These
variables are of no particular interest and so are omitted from the tables for clarity. We also experimented with the
inclusion of variance of the wage oﬀer distribution, but in all cases this was found to be insigni￿cant and so was
excluded from the estimation.
12About 26% of the observations in the sample are of zero bene￿ts. We treat these individuals as having $0.25 in
bene￿ts per week in order to avoid taking logs of zero. We also applied this adjustment to the asset income variable.
About 35% of individuals did not report any asset income.
7a spell that spans multiple survey points (so that we have multiple observations of WR
it but only
one observation of WL
it) we take the observation closest to the start of the spell.
For our purposes, the most important coeﬃcient is the coeﬃcients on the ￿wage in the previous
job￿ variable, WL
it.I t i s s i g n i ￿cantly diﬀerent both from zero and unity and is much lower than
what we might have anticipated from the evidence of aggregate data (see Blanchard and Katz,
1997). This suggests the presence of persistence in wage setting, but to a much lesser extent than
suggested by aggregate data.
The coeﬃcient on the bene￿ts variable, bit, is correctly signed but statistically insigni￿cant.
T h er e s u l t sa r es i m i l a rt oJ o n e s( 1989) who found a signi￿cant coeﬃcient of 0.24 on the previous
wage and a statistically insigni￿cant coeﬃcient on bene￿ts. His regression was crucially diﬀerent
from ours, however, in so far as he interpreted WL
it as the mean of the distribution of wage oﬀers.
The eﬀect of the regional unemployment rate is signi￿cant. Reservation wages are lower in
regions with higher unemployment - but the size of the eﬀect is small. Unemployment appears to
be less of an in￿uence on reservation wages than either market wages or own previous wages.13
The coeﬃcient on asset income in all of Table 4 seems to be incorrectly signed but signi￿cant.
The negative coeﬃcient could be explained by a spurious correlation caused by the intertemporal
nature of savings. Those who have relatively high savings would tend to be those with less ex-
perience of unemployment through time. And those with relatively low reservation wages would,
ceteris paribus, tend to experience less unemployment. Thus the regression could pick up the eﬀect
of previous unemployment on asset accumulation rather than the eﬀect of assets on labour market
behaviour.
It is useful to see if the eﬀect of previous employment is diﬀerent for men and for women. In
columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 we report the estimates of the model where the full sample is split into
two gender speci￿c sub-samples. It seems that the pooled estimates conceal substantial diﬀerences
between the behaviour of men and women. The market wage matters very little for men ￿ in fact
it is statistically insigni￿cant. In contrast, for women, the coeﬃcient on the market wage is both
signi￿cant and much larger numerically, while the coeﬃcient on the lagged wage is smaller than for
men. It appears that the current ￿objective￿ variable matters for women, whereas male reservation
wage formation is more heavily in￿uenced by the ￿subjective￿ historical variable. This result is
consistent with the view that labour market behaviour of women is more ￿exible.
3.2 Measurement Error and IV Estimates
If we take the results of the last section at face value, then they suggest that there is some persistence
in reservation wages (and therefore unemployment) but that it is less than suggested by aggregate
13This high standard error on unemployment may be due the fact, noted by Card (1995), that there are relatively
few independent observations of the regional level data (only 120 here).
8data and that it varies substantially by gender. Unfortunately, however, the OLS estimates are likely
biased downwards because of the presence of measurement error in the lagged wage variable. Such
error could arise as a result of recall/reporting error and the eﬀects of unobserved compensating
diﬀerentials.
Bound et. al. (1994) suggest that recall error has a signi￿cant impact on wage history data.
However, in a detailed examination of this issue, Halpin (1997) suggests that recall error in BHPS
is low with data relating to 90% of employment spells was internally consistent through time.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,t h em e d i a nl e n g t ho ft i m ef r o mt h ee n do fe m p l o y m e n tt oi n i t i a ls u r v e yw a s4m o n t h s
and 90% of spells were recorded within 11 months, limiting the opportunity for recall error.
Unobserved compensating diﬀerentials are a more problematic source of error. We could control
for to the extent that we knew the characteristics of the previous job and the characteristics of
the job to which the reservation wage relates. Unfortunately, the only characteristics recorded for
previous jobs in the BHPS are occupation and industry choice ￿ which are probably endogenous.14
Similarly hours worked, are not recorded in the BHPS job history data so we cannot control for
hours in the regression.15
One way of dealing with errors is to duplicate the procedure of Bound and Krueger (1991)a n d
Bound et. al. (1994) who conducted validation studies of the CPS and PSID by comparing the
wages reported in the two surveys with administrative data. They found that there were appreciable
measurement errors in reported wages and that the errors were negatively correlated with the true
value of the variables. This reduces the bias, relative to that of classical measurement error, when
earnings is an independent variable.
There is no similar study for the BHPS, but we can get an idea of how measurement error
might aﬀect our results by assuming that the structure of errors is the same as that observed by
Bound et. al. (1994) for the PSID and CPS and use their formula to adjust our OLS estimates.
To be speci￿c, for the moment assume that only WL is measured with error and that the error is
negatively correlated with the true value. We assume that a regression of the error on the observed
value would produces a coeﬃcient of 0.2, a value that is at the upper end of the range of results
reported by them. Applying their formula16, we get a corrected estimate for βL of 0.45.
14Nevertheless, controlling for occupation and industry related compensating diﬀerentials did not change the results
signi￿cantly.
15As an alternative, I tried to predict the hours worked in the last job on the basis of a regression of the hours
worked of currently employed individuals on job and worker characteristics. When lagged wages were adjusted by
these predicted hours, the overall results were similar. This procedure does not inspire great con￿dence, however,
especially as the ￿rst stage hours regression produced an R
2 of only 0.2 suggesting a large errors in variables problem
with the hourly wage.
16β =
￿ βOLS
1−buX where ￿ βOLS is the uncorrected OLS estimate and buX is the coeﬃcient from the regression of the
error on the observed value of W
L. We also assume that the error is uncorrelated with any other variable.
9A more rigorous way of dealing with measurement error is to use IV. We can make use of the
dynamic nature of the BHPS. For a spell of employment that spans two survey dates, we will have
two observations of the wage in that job. One will be the lagged wage variable from the employment
history question in the current wave. The other will be the wage of the then employed worker as
reported in a previous wave of the survey. If we are prepared to assume that any measurement
error is uncorrelated through time, we can use the earlier observation to instrument for the current
one.17
Table 5 shows the results. As expected, the coeﬃcient on the lagged wage variable has risen
by about third ￿ a statistically signi￿cant diﬀerence at the 5% level. The coeﬃcient on the market
wage variable ( ￿ W) has fallen slightly, although the change is not signi￿cant. Overall, the other
coeﬃcients are relatively unchanged when compared to their values under OLS: bene￿ts and regional
unemployment have numerically small elasticities, with bene￿ts being statistically insigni￿cant.
Thus the only eﬀect of IV is to increase the importance of lagged wage relative to the market wage.
This is suﬃcient for a Hausman test to reject the null hypothesis that there is no diﬀerence between
OLS and IV.
A si nt h ec a s eo fO L S ,t h er e g r e s s i o no nt h ef u l ls a m p l eh i d e ss i g n i ￿cant diﬀerences between
the sexes. The null hypothesis of parameter stability across gender groups can easily be rejected
(p-value 0.005). Basically the wage in the previous job is more important to men whereas the
market wage has almost no impact on reservation wage formation. In contrast, for women, the
market wage is as important as the wage in previous job. This suggests that women would be more
realistic in the formation of reservation wages adjusting more quickly to current reality and being
less in￿uenced by the past than are men ￿ again consistent with the view that women are more
￿exible participants in the labour market.
There is a problem with the IV estimates in table 5, however. They are probably not consistent
because of a form of measurement error in ￿ Wit.W h e nw er e p l a c eﬂ Wit with ￿ Wit,w ei n t r o d u c et h e
term ﬂ Wit − ￿ Wit into the residual of the estimated equation. This will typically have an individual
speci￿cc o m p o n e n t( ￿i) i.e. the component of the expected wage that is speci￿c to the individual
and is not correlated with the observed characteristics that were used to construct ￿ Wit. It is almost
certainly the case that WL
it will be positively correlated with ￿i, because wages received in the
past, will probably have been aﬀected by the same individual speci￿c unobservable. Our IV won￿t
control for this and will yield upward biased estimates of the eﬀect of the previous wage on the
reservation wage.
It was for this reason that Feldstein and Poterba (1984) and Jones (1989) rejected the use of
17I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. An F-test on the exclusion of the instrument from
the ￿rst stage regression produces a test statistic of 295 well above the value of 5 that Staiger and Stock (1997)
recommend to avoid the problem of weak instruments.
10a ￿tted value as an estimate of the mean of the wage oﬀer distribution, using instead WL
it as a
proxy for ﬂ Wit. As noted already, this is not an option for us as we are interested precisely in the
possibility that WL
it has an independent in￿uence on the reservation wage.18
Nevertheless it is worth noting that even if the IV estimates of the eﬀect of WL
it are biased
upwards, we can treat them as upper bounds on the true values. A striking implication of this
observation is that the true coeﬃcient must be very low ￿ certainly much lower than unity ￿
implying a degree of persistence lower than suggested by aggregate data. Furthermore there is no
reason to suspect that any bias would diﬀer by gender, so the reservation wage formation of women
still seems more ￿rmly rooted in current economic reality than is men￿s.
3.3 Fixed Eﬀects
We can use of the panel aspect of the data to combat the potential inconsistency caused by the
correlation between WL
it and the residual when ￿ Wit is a regressor. Providing we are prepared to
assume that the individual unobservable eﬀect is constant over time, we should be able to diﬀerence
it out using the ￿xed eﬀects or ￿within groups￿ estimator.
However, we can apply the ￿xed eﬀects estimator only to those individuals who experienced two
or more periods of unemployment during the sample period (so that we can have two independent
observations of WL
it).19 Obviously there are relatively few individuals who match this criteria. More
importantly there is an issue of sample selection. We might expect those who have experienced
several periods of unemployment to have systematically diﬀerent labour market behaviour than
those who experienced only one spell of unemployment over a period of several years. One would
suspect that it is the latter group which would rely on the lagged wage the most. If so, the ￿xed
eﬀects procedure, by excluding them, will tend to underestimate the signi￿cance of the lagged wage
for the population as a whole. The results must be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
We present the ￿xed eﬀects results in the ￿r s tc o l u m no fT a b l e6 . T h e s ea r eq u i t ed i ﬀerent
from the OLS and IV estimates. As was to be expected, the estimate of the coeﬃcient on WL
it is
substantially lower than OLS or IV ￿ measurement error is exacerbated by taking diﬀerences. The
coeﬃcient on the expected future wage is also smaller than the OLS estimate but is signi￿cant at
the 10% level. The coeﬃcient on the bene￿ts variable is correctly signed, but is insigni￿cant. The
coeﬃcient on the local unemployment rate is also insigni￿cant (p-value of 0.11) but correctly signed.
Finally, note that the coeﬃcient on asset income is now positive but insigni￿cant, suggesting that
18Alternatively, we run a reduced form version of the model where ￿ W is replaced by the covariates used to generate
it and we instrument for W
L
it using previous observations as before. This procedure generates an elasticity of previous
wage of 0.45 with a standard error of 0.05, suggesting that the size of any bias is small.
19In particular it is not the case that these individuals experienced one long spell of unemployment during which
we took two (or more) observations of W
R
it at diﬀerent survey points during the same spell. We examine multiple
observations of the same spell in the next section.
11the ￿xed eﬀects estimator correctly accounts for the dynamic relationship between savings and
employment.
As before the estimates for the overall sample conceal substantial diﬀerences between the be-
haviour of men and women (columns two and three of Table 6). The point estimate for the lagged
wage is very close for both gender groups. But, as before, the market wage matters very little for
men ￿ in fact it is statistically insigni￿cant. While, for women, the market wage is both signi￿cant
and much larger numerically. Again it appears that women￿s reservation wages are more in￿uenced
by market forces than are men￿s.
In an attempt to assess whether the ￿xed eﬀects estimator induces a sample selection bias,
w ee s t i m a t e dO L So nt h es a m es u b - s a m p l ei . e . t h o s ew h oe x p e r i e n c e dt w oo rm o r ep e r i o d so f
unemployment. These estimates (available on request) were not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from OLS
for the whole sample (table 4) suggesting that the sample selection induced by the ￿xed eﬀects
estimator is not a problem.20
In any case, even if the ￿xed eﬀects estimate itself is biased downwards (whether because of
sample selection or errors in variables) we can view it as being a lower bound for the true value.
C o m b i n i n gt h i sw i t hI Vu p p e rb o u n dw eh a v ear a n g ef o rt h et r u ev a l u eo ft h ec o e ﬃcient of
(0.15,0.47) ￿ a region bounded away from both zero and one.
4 Robustness
The analysis so far produces a range around the true eﬀect of previous wages on current reservation
wage formation. In this section we see how robust this relationship is when we allow for errors in
the reservation wage variable, search intensity and the eﬀects of duration of unemployment spell.
4.1 Errors in the Reservation Wage Variable
Dominitz (1998) conducted a detailed study of various subjective measures of earnings found that
they were quite accurate on average. Although his study his study did not explicitly include the
reservation wage, the conclusion that subjective measures of future earnings are relatively accurate
lends credibility to our reservation wage measure.
Neverthesless the reservation wage variable could still be measured with error. If that error is
classical i.e. uncorrelated with the true value of any regressors it will not aﬀect the consistency our
estimates so far, only their eﬃciency. We have to consider the possibility, however, of non-classical
measurement error in the dependent variable, which may bias our results.
Some aspects of the data could be interpreted as evidence of error in WR.F o re x a m p l ew en o t e d
in section 2 that on average the re-employment earnings of those unemployed who subsequently got
20An appendix detailing these and other auxiliary results referred to in the text is available from the author.
12jobs were 43% lower than their previously reported reservation wages (but note that the median
is close to unity). This may indicate that the reservation wage is measured with error i.e. that
individuals actually accept wages substantially less than they said they would. Alternatively, it may
just be the eﬀect of duration. As individuals ￿nd themselves spending more time in unemployment
they may moderate their reservation wage until it is low enough for them to secure employment.
We examine the issue of duration dependence in the next subsection. For the moment we will
proceed on the assumption that WR is measured with error. We use the re-employment wage to
perform a analysis of measurement error along the lines of Bound et. al. (1994). We ￿rst interpret
the re-employment wage (WA) as being the true value of the reservation wage (i.e. we ignore the
possibility for duration eﬀects) and the treat the variable WR as being the reservation wage observed
with error. We regress the implied measurement error on all the independent variables used in the
model. It turns out that the ￿error￿ is uncorrelated with any of the variables (including WL and
￿ W) and the adjusted R2 for the regression is only 0.03. This suggests that any measurement error
WR is classical in nature and therefore does not aﬀect the consistency of any regression where WR
is the dependent variable.
As a further check of the robustness of our results. We run our four main regressions with the
(log) reservation wage (lnWR) replaced with the (log) re-employment wage (lnWA). The results
are not shown for brevity but are virtually the same as using the reservation wage. Bassically the
lagged wage and the market wage can explain both the reservation wage and the re-employment
wage in the same manner.
4.2 Duration
I nt h ea n a l y s i ss of a rw eh a v ei g n o r e dt h ei s s u eo fd u r a t i o ne x c e p tt os a yt h a ti tw a sap o s s i b l e
explanation of the diﬀerence between re-employment earnings and previously reported reservation
wages. We have also excluded multiple observations of the same unemployment spell from the
estimation sample. The two issues are related. If we have multiple observations of the same spell
then the only reason that the relationship between the reservation wage and the previous wage
would be diﬀerent at the two points is due to the eﬀect of duration. This could be the result of a
deliberate strategy to reduce reservation wages and/or their link to previous wages in response to
the failure to secure employment. Alternatively, it could just be recall error. Over time individuals
may simply remember the last wage with less accuracy leading to a lower coeﬃcient. Either way
we would observe the eﬀect of previous wages on reservation wages weakening over time. We now
examine this issue explicitly.
In Table 7 we estimate the model controlling for duration using both the IV and Fixed Eﬀects
estimators. The estimation sample includes all those who experience more than two separate
periods of unemployment (i.e. as in table 6) and, in addition, all those for whom we have multiple
13observations of the same unemployment spell. The addition of this latter group increases the sample
size dramatically.
We estimate the same speci￿cation as before with the addition of variables representing the
spell length (for clarity scaled in units of 120 months) and its interaction with the lagged wage and
the market wage. For clarity we report only the variables of primary interest. The ￿rst thing to
note is that there is no direct eﬀect of spell length on reservation wages. Spell length matters only
via its interaction with the previous and market wage variables.21
The IV and FE estimators give similar results. For the sample as a whole, the eﬀect of the
lagged wage diminishes with increasing spell duration.22 Conversely reservation wage formation
becomes progressively more in￿uenced by market wages as the length of unemployment increases.
For example, after one year of unemployment, the IV estimates imply that the elasticity of the
reservation wage with respect to lagged wage would be 0.38 and the market wage elasticity would
have increased to 0.17.
These results allow us to say something about the prevalence of genuine duration dependence
as opposed to recall error. We would expect to ￿nd the negative interaction of duration with the
lagged wage in the case when individuals deliberately reduce their reliance on past wages in order
to secure employment. We would also expect to ￿nd a negative interaction when individuals simply
remember their previous wage with increasing vagueness over time. However, in this case, we would
n o te x p e c tt os e et h ei n c r e a s i n gi n ￿uence of the market wage (except in the unlikely event that the
recall error in WL
it is positively correlated with ￿ Wit).
As before it is instructive to split the sample by gender. For men, both of the interaction terms
are insigni￿cant whereas for women the interaction with the previous wage is highly signi￿cant. At
the onset of unemployment the lagged wage has a slightly bigger impact on women￿s than on men￿s
reservation wage formation (0.49 vs. 0.41). This is the opposite result to what we had earlier (see
Table 5 and Table 6). But the eﬀect of WL
it declines about nine times faster for women than for
men. Similarly, at the onset of unemployment the market wage has much more impact on women
than men.
The results are pretty striking. They suggest that women adjust more completely and more
quickly to market reality than do men. Furthermore for both groups the wage received in the
previous job has a signi￿cant aﬀect on reservation wages. But the coeﬃcient is much less than
unity ￿ even at the start of the spell.
21Higher orders of interaction and interactions with other variables also proved insigni￿cant.
22A caveat: we have ignored the possibility of simultaneous relationship beween duration and unemployment.
144.3 Search Intensity
Recall from section 2 that searchers and non-searchers seemed to have diﬀerent ￿ but not completely
diﬀerent reservation wage formation. Speci￿cally searchers have both higher reservation wages and
higher wages upon re-employment. We can now analyse this more formally. In table 8 we show the
results of our IV procedure and our FE estimator applied to the sample as a whole and separately
to searchers and non-searchers. For clarity we focus on the two coeﬃcients of interest i.e. the
coeﬃcients on lnWL and ln ￿ W.T h e￿rst column summarizes the results from tables 5 and 6. From
columns two and three we see that lagged wages matter more to searchers than to non-searchers
whereas the market wage matters more to non-searchers. Although for men, the eﬀect of lagged
wage is approximately the same for both searchers and non-searchers. The pattern is the same for
both the IV and FE estimates. (The sample size is so small as to render the ￿xed eﬀects estimates
for the separate gender groups insigni￿cant). In all cases F-tests of parameter stability across search
status are rejected at 1%s i g n i ￿cance level.
These results are capable of several interpretations. The ￿rst point to note is that search
intensity ￿ which is proxied by our dichotomous search vs. non-searching classi￿cation ￿ is probably
chosen jointly with reservation wages. Secondly, even allowing for any endogeneity, we might
expect that those who searched more intensively would also have a more realistic approach to the
labour market and place less weight on previous wages. But this is not what the results suggest.
They show that the reservation wage formation of searchers is more ￿rmly rooted in the past
than is the reservation wages of the non-searchers insofar as the lagged wage matters more (and
the market wages matters less) for the searchers than for the non-searchers. This is a curious
result. What seems to be behind it, is the eﬀect of duration. Searchers have shorter duration than
non-searchers. As we showed above, increased duration leads to more realistic reservation wage
formation. Therefore the results could be picking up a discouraged worker eﬀect i.e. as duration of
unemployment increases, workers adopt more realistic wage demands but also search less intensely.
5 Conclusions
This paper set out to ￿nd the determinants of the reservation wage and to indicate what the
structure of reservation wages implies for the evolution of the natural rate of unemployment. We
￿nd that the wage in a previous job and the expected future wage are both important determinants
of the reservation wage.
Our results are clear, and appear robust to a number of alternative speci￿cations. The central
result of the paper is the eﬀect of the wage in the previous job on reservation wages. Allowing
for measurement error and individual speci￿c unobservables, we show that this elasticity lies in the
range (0.15,0.47).
15As this range is signi￿cantly greater than zero, we have found evidence of wage inertia at the
micro level. Nevertheless this entire range is surprisingly low ￿ lower than we might have expected
from looking at the aggregate data. The implication of this result is that the reservation wages of
the unemployed will adjust to any shock relatively quickly. This in turn implies that the natural
rate of unemployment will adjust relatively quickly to shocks. This result is at odds with Ball and
Moﬃt( 2 0 0 1)w h o￿nd evidence in aggregate data that U.S. workers adjust their (aggregate) wage
aspirations slowly to productivity shocks. Further work is needed to reconcile these results.
Our results also show that there is considerable variation across genders, suggesting that women
react more completely and more quickly to market reality than do men. The wage in the previous
job is more important to men whereas the market wage has almost no impact on their reservation
wage formation. In contrast, for women, the market wage is at least as important as the wage in
previous job. This suggests that women would be more realistic in the formation of reservation
wages adjusting more quickly to current reality and being less in￿uenced by the past than are men.
This is consistent with the view that labour market behaviour of women is more ￿exible than men￿s.
We also ￿nd evidence for a duration eﬀect. As duration of unemployment grows reservation
wage formation becomes more realistic with lagged wages exerting progressively less in￿uence, while
market wages exerts a greater in￿uence, on reservation wage formation. Similarly we ￿nd that the
reservation wages of searchers (non-searchers) are more (less) heavily in￿uenced by previous wages
than market wages. We interpret this as evidence of a discouraged worker eﬀect: as duration
increases individuals reduce the linkage between previous wages and reservation wages, but they
also search less intensely.
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17Table 1: The BHPS Data
Variable De￿nition Mean Stn. Dev
age age at interview 35.79 13.3
bit bene￿ts received (per week) 45.86 55.01
WR
it reservation wage (per week) 126.25 84.32
ait investment income (per week) 3.94 17.46
￿ Wit constructed mean wage (per week) 171.41 73.87
WL
it net wage in previous job (per week) 152.72 124.9
Urt Regional unemployment rate2 6.72 2.44
WA
it Wage accepted on re-employment 127.30 86.61
length time since last job (in months) 17.45 21.3
search =1 if ￿actively searched￿ for a job during past month 0.57 0.49
white ethnic background (=1 if white) 0.94 0.22
sex sex (=1 if male) 0.48 0.49
1. Statistics are calculated for the pooled cross section
2. From UK Oﬃce of National StatisticsT a b l e2 :S o m eK e yV a r i a b l e s
Variable Mean Stn. Median Percentiles
Dev 5th 95th
Spell Length (months)1 Searchers 12.89 17.52 7 0 50
Non Searchers 23.58 24.22 13 1 77
Reservation Wage (WR
it )S e a r c h e r s145.95 86.04 136.59 42.51 285.44
Non Searchers 99.76 74.14 78.53 21.81 236.97
Previous Wage1 (WL
it)S e a r c h e r s164.811 37.43 142.86 34.22 374.56
Non Searchers 136.49 103.69 118.88 22.78 344.31
Re-employment Wage (WA
it )S e a r c h e r s143.04 85.64 134.02 25.48 290.72
Non Searchers 96.15 79.89 73.85 15.35 219.03
Reservation/Previous (WR
it /WL
it)S e a r c h e r s 1.28 1.94 0.94 0.36 2.84
Non Searchers 1.12 1.43 0.79 0.163 . 2 6
Reservation/Re-emp. (WR
it /WA
it )S e a r c h e r s 1.39 1.64 0.99 0.42 3.64
Non Searchers 1.47 1.84 0.93 0.194 . 2 1
1. Includes multiple observations of the same spells at diﬀerent points in time
Table 3: The Distribution of Reservation Wage Ratio
Proportion of (WR/WL) less than
Sample 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.5 2.0 3.0
All 0.20 0.43 0.61 0.73 0.83 0.90 0.95
Male 0.16 0.40 0.61 0.74 0.86 0.92 0.96
Female 0.25 0.46 0.62 0.71 0.80 0.87 0.93
Searchers 0.12 0.37 0.58 0.71 0.82 0.90 0.95
Non-Searchers 0.31 0.51 0.66 0.75 0.84 0.90 0.94
Male Searchers 0.09 0.35 0.59 0.73 0.85 0.92 0.96
Male Non-Searchers 0.31 0.51 0.66 0.77 0.88 0.93 0.96
Female Searchers 0.15 0.40 0.57 0.67 0.77 0.87 0.94
Female Non-Searchers 0.32 0.50 0.66 0.74 0.82 0.88 0.93
19Table 4: OLS Estimation
Dependent Variable: lnWR
it
(1)( 2 ) 2 (3)2
Sample All Male Female
lnWL
it 0.35 0.42 0.28
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
(lnbit)/100 1.06 0.93 2.30
(0.74) (0.71)( 1.42)
ln ￿ Wit 0.29 0.06 0.40
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
(lnUrt)/100 -8.59 -9.51 -9.34
(4.02) (4.35) (6.59)
(lnait)/100 -0.97 -2.63 0.84
(1.22) (1.28) (2.07)
N 1,248 6146 3 4
ﬂ R2 0.40 0.35 0.22
1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for
estimation of ￿ Wit
2. ￿ Wit calculated separately for each sub-sample.
3. All regressions also include a constant, cubic
in age and number of dependent children.
4. lna ,l n U and lnb are all divided by 100
20Table 5: IV Estimation
Dependent Variable: lnWR
it
(1)( 2 ) 2 (3)2
Sample All Male Female
lnWL
it 0.47 0.57 0.38
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
(lnbit)/100 1.13 1.21 2.09
(0.73) (0.73) (1.39)
ln ￿ Wit 0.25 0.06 0.36
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
(lnUrt)/100 -8.52 -10.0 -8.76
(3.94) (4.43) (6.44)
(lnait)/100 -2.01 -3.88 -0.08
(1.24) (1.38) (2.08)
N 1,248 6146 3 4
ﬂ R2 0.40 0.33 0.21
Hausman test χ2 25.37 34.66 12.04
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15)
1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for
estimation of ￿ Wit
2. ￿ Wit calculated separately for each sub-sample.
3. All regressions also include a constant, cubic
in age and number of dependent children.
4. WL is instrumented by alternative observations of the previous wage






it 0.150 . 160 . 14
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
(lnbit)/100 0.84 1.15- 1.19
(0.96) (0.88) (2.39)
ln ￿ Wit 0.180 . 0 1 0.23
(0.11) (0.08) (0.16)
(lnUrt)/100 -0.20 -0.12- 0 . 2 9
(0.13) (0.13) (0.23)
(lnait)/100 3.14- 3 . 189 . 0 4
(2.49) (2.66) (4.45)
N 320 189 131
ﬂ T 2.3 2.3 2.2
R2 0.11 0.20 0.11
1. Standard errors (parentheses) adjusted for
estimation of ￿ Wit
2. ￿ Wit calculated separately for each sample
3. All regressions also include a constant, cubic in age
and number of dependent children.
4. N = number of persons,
ﬂ T = avg. number of obs. per person






it ln ￿ Wit lnWL
it ln ￿ Wit lnWL
it ln ￿ Wit
Level 0.45 0.13 0.49 0.02 0.41 0.38
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11)
Interaction -0.72 0.41 0.130 . 17- 1.19 -0.32
with length/120 (0.24) (0.23) (0.37) (0.34) (0.32) (0.43)
N 2,204 1,026 1,178
Fixed Eﬀects
Level 0.21 0.04 0.16 0.00 0.23 0.32
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.13)
Interaction -0.44 0.46 -0.19 0.04 -0.76 -0.24
with length/120 (0.10) (0.18) (0.16) (0.26) (0.16) (0.36)
NT 2,493 1,297 1,196
1. Standard errors are in parentheses
2. ￿ Wit calculated separately for each sample
3. All regressions also include a constant, cubic in age
and number of dependent children






it ln ￿ Wit lnWL
it ln ￿ Wit lnWL
it ln ￿ Wit
IV: All 0.47 0.25 0.58 0.120 . 2 9 0 . 5 2
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14)
N 1,248 782 466
IV: Men 0.57 0.07 0.54 0.07 0.61 0.11
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.18)
N 6144 6 5149
IV: Women 0.39 0.43 0.59 0.160 . 2 2 0 . 6 7
(0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.14) (0.10) (0.19)
N 634 3173 17
FE: All 0.160 . 18 0.20 -0.00 0.02 -0.29
(0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.11)( 0 . 12) (0.35)
N 320 1811 39
1. Standard errors are in parentheses
2. ￿ Wit calculated separately for each sample
3. All regressions also include a constant, cubic in age
and number of dependent children
24